User-generated data is crucial to predictive modeling in many applications. With a web/mobile/wearable interface, an online service provider (SP) can continuously record user-generated data and depend on various predictive models learned from the data to improve their services and revenue. SPs owning a large collection of usergenerated data have raised privacy concerns. We present a privacypreserving framework, SecureBoost, which allows users to submit encrypted or randomly masked data to SPs that want to learn predictive models. Our framework utilizes random linear classifiers (RLCs) as the base classifiers in the boosting framework to simplify the design of privacy-preserving protocols. A Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) is used to assist an SP's processing, reducing the complexity of the protocol constructions while the leakage of information to the CSP is limited. We present two constructions of SecureBoost: HE+GC and SecSh+GC, using combinations of homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, and random masking to achieve both security and efficiency. For a boosted model, the SP learns only the base models (i.e., RLCs) and the CSP learns only the weights of the base models. This separated parameter holding avoids any party from abusing the final model or conducting model-based attacks. We have conducted extensive experiments to understand the quality of the RLC-based boosting and the cost distribution of the constructions. Our results show that SecureBoost can efficiently learn high-quality boosting models from protected user-generated data.
INTRODUCTION
Many applications such as search engine, movie recommendation, healthcare, and social networking depend on learning from usergenerated data such as clickthroughs, tweets, reviews and ratings, group interactions, and sensor readings of daily activities [16, 26, 27] . It is a common scenario in which a service provider (SP) delivers services to its users (henceforth referred as users) via web/mobile/wearable applications. By tracking users' activities via the applications, SP can collect a large amount of user-related data, which are used to not only improve the quality of SP's services, but to also enable SP to precisely deliver personalized contents such as targeted advertisements.
Though highly beneficial to users and SPs alike, the massive collection of user data and incredibly powerful big data analytics raise great privacy concerns. First, SP's infrastructures, if poorly secured, can be compromised by external hackers, resulting in leaked sensitive user data. Recent data breach incidents involved SPs such as Target, Ashley Madison, and Equifax [30, 38] . Second, unauthorized retrieval, sharing, or misuse of users' personal information by insiders [8, 11] are difficult to detect and prevent. Thus, SP has a great responsibility for protecting the privacy of massive sensitive data collection. As we are increasingly relying on data-driven services and analytics offered by different SPs, it is imperative to build effective privacy-preserving data mining frameworks that provide strong privacy guarantee without compromising the utility of user-generated data.
To protect data privacy and relieve SP's burden, one approach is to learn models from protected data. Naive adaptation of the wellknown security primitives such as the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [17] , garbled circuits (GC) [39] , and secret sharing [35] in building privacy frameworks prove too expensive [29, 32] . A few recent studies [9, [31] [32] [33] started blending multiple cryptographic primitives and adapted to specific privacy settings to work around the performance bottlenecks. These "hybrid" constructions mix different cryptographic primitives to implement the key algorithmic components of a protocol with reasonable overheads. In addition, to relieve users from active participation in the protocols, a third party called cryptographic service provider (CSP) is introduced to manage keys, build circuits, and assist SP in the protocols [32] .
While adapting a hybrid approach looks promising, there are several challenges. First, it is complex to optimally select and assemble primitives to implement functionalities of existing machine learning algorithms. For example, Nikolaenko et al. [32, 33] develop matrix factorization and linear ridge regression protocols using FastGC [23] and additive homomorphic encryption (AHE). They map the core algorithm, Cholesky decomposition, to a GC implementation, which is quite expensive in communication. Factoring a small 100×100 matrix with 4096 non-zero elements takes about 40GB traffic between SP and CSP [32] . This clearly is expensive and indicates the difficulty of balancing cost and utility even with the hybrid approaches.
Moreover, it appears even trickier to select a right machine learning algorithm or modify one to significantly reduce the complexity of its privacy-preserving version. Fundamentally, there may be tradeoffs among the easiness of developing a privacy-preserving protocol for the learning algorithm, the overhead of the protocol, and the learned model's prediction power. On one side, it is easier to implement some protocols for less powerful algorithms such as linear classifiers and linear regressions [19, 31, 33] . On the other side, more powerful machine learning algorithms, such as SVM and deep neural networks require complex operations whose straightforward secure implementation does not scale well to large datasets [31] .
Finally, existing approaches [19, 31, 33] do not consider modelbased inference attacks possibly conducted by a curious SP. Recent studies [13, 14, 37] have shown that attackers can use a learned predictive model and its output to estimate the sensitive attributes in users' data. The key step of these attacks is that attackers can freely apply the model to any input data. To protect against these attack, one reasonable approach is to prevent a curious SP from seeing the complete model in the learning process. This change of setting may require a significant redesign of current approaches.
Scope of Work and Contributions
We develop the SecureBoost framework to not only address the fundamental conflict between the model prediction power and the complexity of its privacy-preserving learning algorithms but also avoid SP seeing or inferring the complete model. The core idea is to utilize the simple yet powerful boosting framework to design practical privacy-preserving boosting protocols. Recent studies [6] show that the boosting models are among the most powerful prediction models including SVM and Random Forest. It has also been a popular method in learning to rank [7] , which is the working behind commercial search engines. The boosting theory [15] enables us to derive highly powerful classifiers using a linear combination of weak classifiers (e.g., a classifier with prediction accuracy slightly > 50% for two-class problems). We consider this an opportunity for developing efficient yet powerful hybrid privacy-preserving classification protocols.
The choice of a weak classifier is a critical problem to implement efficient privacy-preserving boosting. In most literature, decision stumps are used as the weak classifiers for their simplicity and fast convergence of boosting. Although the training algorithm for a decision stump is quite simple, it appears expensive to implement its privacy-preserving version [28] . Our first principal design is to use random linear classifiers (RLCs) as the weak classifiers instead. For a linear classifier f (x) = w T x, where x is the feature vector and w is the parameter vector to learn, an RLC sets w to be random using a specific generation method independent of training data. This random generation of the classifier trivializes the training step and the only requirement is testing to determine whether the random classifier is a valid weak classifier (e.g., accuracy > 50%). In experiments, we have found that such random base classifier generation method works satisfactorily in learning a strong boosting model; for every 1-3 random tries we can find a valid weak classifier using our generation method, and the resulting models are comparable to those generated with decision stumps as base classifiers but at a slightly slower convergence rate. The use of RLC also allows us to conveniently protect feature vectors and labels and to greatly reduce the costs of other related steps.
We have designed two privacy-preserving constructions to implement the RLC-based boosting framework to understand the effect of different cryptographic primitives on the associated complexities and expenses. The constructions are based on the honest-but-curious SP-CSP setting. Both protocols result in models with distributed parameters between the SP and the CSP: the SP holding the RLCs' parameters and the CSP holding the base classifier's weights of the boosted models, and no party knows the other's holding.
The first construction of SecureBoost uses the homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes, including additive homomorphic encryption (AHE) such as the Paillier scheme [34] , or somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) such as the Ring-based Learning-with-Error (RLWE) scheme [3] , to protect user-generated training examples. HE enables homomorphic additions and multiplications of encrypted data by SP. A garbled-circuit based component is used for CSP to securely learn the correctness of the base classifier's prediction on each training example, a critical step in the boosting framework. We call this construction "HE+GC", which is further differentiated as "RLWE+GC" or "Paillier+GC". Our evaluation results show that RLWE+GC is more scalable to the number of training examples.
The second construction uses the secret-sharing (SecSh) scheme to protect user data. Instead of using encryption, the user splits a training example into two random shares (the sum of which recovers the original training example) and distributes them to SP and CSP, respectively. SP and CSP use the recently developed protocols [9, 31] to collaboratively compute additions and multiplications with preserved privacy. The multiplication protocol uses AHE to protect the intermediate results [9, 31] . We call this construction "SecSh+GC". SecSh+GC saves users' submission and SP's storage costs, however, increases the computational burden on both SP and CSP.
Both the constructions of SecureBoost require a leakage function for CSP -the correctness of RLC's prediction on each training example. We carefully analyze the security of the constructions, based on the universally composable (UC) security paradigm [4, 5] , and show that these constructions satisfy the UC security definition.
We summarize the unique contributions as follows.
• We propose to use random linear classifiers as the base weak classifiers to effectively simplify the protocol design while still preserving the quality of boosting model. Our evaluation shows that by using RLC not decision stump, the overall cost can be reduced by at least 15 times.
• We take a hybrid approach to design the robust privacypreserving boosting framework. We have developed two constructions: HE+GC and SecSh+GC, with the combination of security primitives such as GC, SHE, Secret Sharing, AHE, and random masking. Several optimization methods have been carefully integrated into the application of the primitives, such as minimized bit representation and efficient GC circuits.
• Our framework provably preserves the privacy of users' submitted data, including both feature vectors and their associated labels, with a leakage function only known by CSP. In addition, our protocols generate model parameters distributed to SP and CSP, which effectively prevents model-based attacks by a curious SP.
• We have conducted an extensive experimental evaluation of the two SecureBoost constructions with both synthetic and real datasets to fully understand the costs and associated tradeoffs. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 specifies the building blocks of SecureBoost. Section 3 outlines the proposed framework along with the security model. Section 4 outlines the HE+GC construction of SecureBoost while section 5 describes the SecSh+GC construction. Section 6 inspects the associated cost complexity for the constructions. Section 7 shows with informal proofs that both constructions satisfy the desired security guarantees. Section 8 showcases the experimental evaluation of SecureBoost and presents several performance and comparative results. Finally, Section 9 acknowledges significant related works followed by concluding remarks in Section 10.
PRELIMINARY
We use lower case letters for vectors or scalars; capital letters for matrices, and large integers; single indexed lower case letters for vectors, double indexed lower case letters for vector elements; and capital letters with indices for matrix rows. We use comma-separated indices to represent two complementary shares of vectors, matrices, and scalars. Let R be all real numbers. We represent encryption with E( ) and element-wise multiplication between two vectors as '.*'.
Boosting
Boosting is a general purpose ensemble strategy that generates a linear combination of several weak base classifiers (whose prediction power is slightly better than random guessing) to produce a highquality classifier. Specifically, given training examples {(x i , y i ), i = 1 . . . n}, where x i are feature vectors and y i are labels, it learns a model H (x) = τ t =1 α t h t (x), where h t is a weak classifier that outputs the predictionŷ for the actual label y and α t is the learned weight for predicting strength of h t . The most popular weak classifier has been the decision stump [15] , which is merely based on conditions like if X j < v j , output 1; otherwise, -1, where X j is a certain feature and X j < v j is some optimal split that gives the best prediction accuracy among all possible single-feature splits for the training dataset. Algorithm 1 Boosting(T , τ ) 1: input: training data samples T = {(x i , y i ), i = 1 . . . n, where x i ∈ R and y i = {1, −1} }, number of base classifiers: τ 2: Initialize the sample weights δ 1i ← 1/n for i = 1 . . . n; 3: for t ← 1 to τ do 4: learn a weak classifier h t (x ) with sample weights δ t,i ,i = 1 . . . n;
5:
for j ← 1 to n do 6: e t,i = 1 if h t (δ t,i x i ) == y i else 0; α t = l n((1 − er r or )/er r or ); 10: δ t +1, i = δ t,i exp(α i e t,i ) for i = 1 . . . n; 11:
Algorithm 1 outlines the boosting algorithm for the two-class problem. The core operation is to train a base model based on weighted samples -the incorrectly predicted samples in the last round getting higher weights in this round, and each base classifier's weight, α t , determined by the base classifier's prediction accuracy.
Additive Homomorphic Encryption
For any two integers α and β, an AHE scheme allows the additive homomorphic operation: E(α + β) = f (E(α), E(β)) where the function f works on encrypted values without decryption. Paillier encryption [34] is one of the most efficient AHE implementations. With one operand, either α or β, unencrypted, we can convert the multiplication between α and β: E(α β) = E( β i=1 α) to additions. We call this operation pseudo-homomorphic multiplication as one of the operands is not actually encrypted. With the homomorphic addition and pseudo-homomorphic multiplication, we can derive pseudo-homomorphic dot-product of vectors, matrix-vector multiplication, and matrix-matrix multiplication, as long as one of the operands is in plaintext. The unencrypted operand either needs to be non-sensitive information or must be protected with some masking and de-masking mechanism.
RLWE Homomorphic Encryption
The RLWE scheme is based on the intractability of the learningwith-error (LWE) problem in polynomial ring [2] . It allows both homomorphic addition and multiplication. A ciphertext in RLWE is represented as a two-tuple (c 0 , c 1 ), where c 0 and c 1 are polynomials. Let C i = (c 0,i , c 1,i ) and C j be the ciphertext of any two values. The encrypted addition of the two values is simply (c 0,i + c 0, j , c 1,i + c 1, j ). The encrypted multiplication is translated to a series of polynomial operations on the ciphertext elements. RLWE allows multiple levels of multiplication with a certain cost. For details, please refer to the paper [2] .
Message packing [2] was invented to pack multiple ciphertexts into one polynomial, greatly reducing the ciphertext size -e.g., we can pack about 630 encrypted values (slots) in one 8190-degree polynomial. With message packing, matrices and vectors can be stored in a certain format. For a vector v n , if n ≤ h, where h is the number of slots, v n is extended with 0 paddings to form a h-length vector, which is then encrypted as one ciphertext. When n > h, the vector is broken down to l = ⌈n/h⌉ parts, with the ultimate slots of the final part filled with 0 wherever empty. Matrix can be encoded similarly, either in row-major or column-major form, depending on the desired operations. If E(A n×k ) is a column-major matrix formed by encryption of its k column vectors as described above, where each column packed into l ciphertexts, the matrix-vector multiplication, E(A) * E(b), with a vector b requires k replications and lk multiplications and additions [21] , where the replication operation is quite expensive compared to the other operations.
Randomized Secret Sharing
The randomized secret sharing method [9] protects data by splitting it into two (or multiple) random shares, the sum of which recovers the original data and distributes them to two (or multiple) parties. Several protocols have been developed to enable fundamental operations such as addition and multiplication based on distributed random shares, producing results that are also random shares. With the basic operations, more complex functions can be constructed. Multiplication of two integers that are stored as random shares, respectively, appears expensive as the triplet generation method [9, 31] developed to enable shared multiplication requires AHE or Oblivious Transfer (OT) to exchange the intermediate data securely. Our evaluation shows that although randomized secret sharing brings low storage cost, the associated computational and communication costs are quite high.
Garbled Circuits
Garbled Circuits (GC) [39] allow two parties, each holding an input to a function, to securely evaluate the function without revealing any information about the input data. The function is implemented with a circuit using a number of basic gates such as AND and XOR gates. The truth table of each gate is encrypted so that no information is leaked during the evaluation, e.g., each 0 or 1 value in the truth table is replaced with securely generated labels. One party creates the circuit and the other one evaluates it. All inputs are converted to labels and securely passed to the evaluator via the 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) [1] protocol. During the recent years, a number of optimization techniques have been developed to minimize the cost of GC, such as Free XOR gates [25] , Half AND gates [40] , and OTExtensions [1] . GC is used in our constructions to learn the correctness of the base classifier's prediction on each training example. Figure 1 shows the SecureBoost framework and the involved parties: the Service Provider (SP), the users who contribute personal data for model training, and the Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP). The learning protocol consists of multiple rounds of SP-CSP interactions, which builds a boosted model on the global pool of user-contributed training data. Ultimately, SP learns the parameter of each base classifier but no additional knowledge about the protected user data; CSP learns the weights of the base classifiers and a certain type of leakage information that does not help breach the privacy of protected user data. To classify a new record with the learned model, SP takes the encrypted record submitted by a user and applies the model in collaboration with the CSP as a secure function evaluation. SP must depend on CSP to decrypt and release the output. This way, CSP can use existing mechanisms to verify and restrict model application requests from SP, reducing the risk of model-based attacks. SP collects user-generated data in encrypted form, and thus undertakes the major storage cost and is also expected to take major computation-intensive components of the privacy-preserving protocol. To achieve scalability SP may also utilize (untrusted) public clouds if the assumption of honest-but-curious is also held for public clouds. On the other hand, CSP is a party with limited resources.
FRAMEWORK
Due to its sensitive operations such as storing private keys and decryptions, CSP cannot scale with public clouds. It mainly assists SP in intermediate steps, e.g. encrypting/ decrypting intermediate results and constructing garbled circuits. CSP is allowed to learn some leakage function but remains oblivious to users' data. The concept of CSP has been used and justified by other approaches [32, 33] as a practical setting.
Note: The dotted line from users to CSP in Figure 1 represents the protocols using the secret-sharing method where users split their submissions to random shares and submit one share to CSP.
SecureBoost Learning Protocol
In this section, we describe the rationale and benefits of using RLCs as the base classifiers, the major components of the SecureBoost protocol, and the security goals.
3.1.1 RLCs as Base Classifiers. The original boosting framework uses decision stumps as the base classifiers. However, it is expensive to implement their privacy-preserving versions as shown in previous studies [28] , as each decision stump involves scanning through all the possible splits for all the features in the training data. Instead of using decision stumps, we choose randomly generated linear classifiers (RLC) as the base classifiers in SecureBoost. An RLC generates a boundary plane in the form of w T x + b with randomly selected w and b. We hope this random boundary serves as a weak classifier that is slightly better than a random guess. Apparently, most random settings of w and b do not generate meaningful classifiers. As Figure 2 shows, the generated plane needs to shatter the training data space into two partitions of significant sizes. For this purpose, we require the submitted data be normalized to distribute the training vectors around the origin. In practice, with the standardization procedure, i.e., each dimension X i is normalized with The use of RLC has several unique benefits. First, it enables learning with both the feature vectors and labels that are protected. In practice, we can transform the training data as x ← (x, 1) and w ← (w, b), with which the hypothesis function simply changes to h(x) = w T x. For a two-class problem with labels y ∈ {−1, 1}, if the result h(x) gives a correct prediction, i.e., the same sign as the label y, we always get h(x)y = w T xy > 0; otherwise w T xy ≤ 0. With this simplification, we facilitate evaluation of xy together and thus the users can submit the encrypted version of xy, protecting both feature vectors and labels. Second, it simplifies the learning of base classifiers. As w is randomly generated, there is no need for SP to consider sample weights during learning. On the other hand, the learning of base-classifier weights can be individually done by CSP. The overall cost of RLC-based boosting learning is much lower than that of decision-stump based boosting. Finally, RLC-based learning enables only the CSP to learn the weights of base models, and thus prevents SP from freely using the final model despite its access to the w vectors.
We verified with our experiments that boosting with RLCs can generate high-quality models comparable to those based on boosting with decision stumps. Moreover, boosting with RLCs seems to outperform boosting of other more optimized linear classifiers such as linear means classifier (LMC), Fisher's Discriminant Analysis, and Perceptrons. The possible reason is that these optimized classifiers tend to be more stable with weighted learning examples than random classifiers and decision stumps. As a result, the boosted model becomes a linear combination of a group of highly similar base classifiers, hence not giving the expected good performance.
SecureBoost Protocol.
The SecureBoost learning protocol is defined with a 4-tuple: SB-Learning = (Setup, BaseApply, ResultEval, Update). Algorithm 2 shows the use of these components in the boosting framework. For a boosted model
, SP learns the base models {h t (x) = w T t x, t = 1..τ }, and CSP learns the model weights {α t , t = 1..τ }.
(δ t +1 , α t , e t )← Update(K , δ t , I t ); //by CSP only 6: if τ effective base models have been found then 7: stop the iteration; 8: end if 9: end for
The key K is generated by a certain party(ies) (CSP, SP, or both) as required, with the desired security level 1 k and all public keys are published. (2) CSP initializes δ 1 with 1/n. (3) The training data Z of n instances contains row vectors z i = x i y i , which is protected with either a public-key encryption scheme or random masking (e.g., in the secret-sharing construction) to generate E(Z ). (4) SP sets the desired number of classifiers, τ , and generates a pool of prospective RLCs with parameters w t for t = 1 . . . p, where p is the pool size proportionally larger than τ , e.g., p = 1.5τ .
With the encrypted training data E(Z ) and a model parameter w t , the procedure will output the model h t 's encrypted prediction results on all training instances.
With the encrypted prediction results, ResultEval allows CSP (not SP) to learn the indicator vector I t of length n, indicating the correctness of h t 's prediction for each training instance.
(δ t +1 , α t , e t ) ← Update(δ t , I t ): CSP takes I t , δ t to compute the weighted error rate e t = I T t δ t and then the weight α t = 0.5ln((1 − e t )/e t ) for the base classifier h t . Also, CSP uses the sample weight updating formula to get δ t +1 f orthenextiteration.
In the end, SP learns {w t , t = 1..p} and CSP learns {α t , t = 1..p}. A two-party function evaluation protocol can be easily developed for SP to apply the model for classification, which, however, is not the focus of this paper. Note that since CSP is involved in the model evaluation, CSP can effectively control or verify each model application with users to avoid SP arbitrarily using the model to compromise user data privacy [13, 14] .
Security Model
We make some relevant security assumptions here: (1) Both SP and CSP are honest-but-curious parties. They follow exactly the protocols and provide services as expected. However, they are interested in users' data. With above assumptions, we consider the curious SP and CSP the major adversaries in our framework. While the integrity of data and computation is equally important, we consider it orthogonal to our study. We concern with the privacy of the following assets.
1. Privacy of training data. User-generated training data may include personal sensitive information. We consider both feature values and the labels sensitive. For example, a user's fitness activity dataset may contain sensitive features such as heart rate and locations, while the labels, i.e., the type of activity, may imply their activity patterns and health conditions. SecureBoost protocol will not leak any information enabling SP or CSP to breach data privacy, except for CSP learning a leakage function.
2. Privacy of prediction models. Model parameters are split and distributed between SP and CSP. No single party can learn the complete model.
The CSP learned leakage function is the indicator function I t,i (h t (x i ) == y i ), for i = 1..n in the iteration t of SecureBoost. We argue that this leakage function does not help CSP learn the complete boosted model H (x) as long as SP holds {w t , t = 1..τ } as secrets. Neither does it reveal anything about the encrypted training data. Similarly, SP learning w t does not help revealing any α t .
We adopt the universally composable (UC) security [4, 5] to formally define the protocol security. UC addresses the security of complex protocols that consist of multiple instances of sub-protocols. It considers a certain protocol π implements an ideal functionality F , where multiple parties (SP and CSP in our case), P i , are involved in the protocol. An honest-but-curious adversary A can corrupt a party and gain access to all the inputs and outputs of that party. However, A will honestly conduct the corrupted party's protocol actions due to the honest-but-curious assumption. An environment machine Z with some input parameter z (e.g., users' submitted data) can provide the input to any party and read the contents of all parties' outputs in both the Real and Idealworld. When the interaction ends, the environment Z outputs a single bit (e.g., some true/false assertion about the computation).
Let Real π, A, Z (k, z, r ) denote the output of environment Z in a real protocol execution, when interacting with adversary A and the protocol π on security parameter k, input z, and random input r = (r Z , r A , r i ) for P i . Real π, A, Z (k, z, r ) is a random variable when r is uniformly chosen.
Meanwhile, let Ideal F, S, Z (k, z, r ) represent the output of environment Z in an ideal process, where the ideal functionality F is evaluated with inputs from an simulator S of adversary, a set of honest parties P i , the environment machine Z, and r = (r Z , r S , r i ) for P i . Similarly, Ideal F, S, Z (k, z, r ) is also a random variable in terms of uniformly random input r .
We say that π securely realizes F if for any adversary A there exists an ideal-process simulator S with probabilistic algorithms running in polynomial time (i.e., PPT), such that for any environment Z,
where neдl(k) is a negligible function [24] . In our security analysis in Section 7, we will try to show such a simulator S exist for both the core protocol components.
CONSTRUCTION WITH HE AND GC
In this section, we present the homomorphic encryption (HE) and GC based construction of SecureBoost. The use of RLC greatly simplifies the crypto operations. With the HE encrypted data, the BaseApply procedure is essentially the homomorphic operation E(Z )w t that is allowed by both Paillier and RLWE cryptosystems. We use a garbled-circuit based protocol to allow only CSP to learn the indicator vector I t , without leaking any other information to the parties. In the following, we first describe the construction of the protocol components and then discuss several key technical details.
Setup. CSP generates the HE public and private key and distributes the public key to the users and SP. Users encrypt their submission. SP generates the pool of p prospective weak classifier vectors, {w t , t = 1..p}.
BaseApply. With the matrix-vector homomorphic operations enabled by HE, SP computes {E(u t ) = E(Zw t ), t = 1..p}. As this step can be done locally by SP, SP can conduct this work offline before the protocol interactions start.
ResultEval. The problem setting is that SP holds E(u t ) and CSP wants to know the sign of each element of u t , i.e., Zw t > 0 implying correct prediction by the RLC, which sets the corresponding element of I t to 1; otherwise to 0. The sign of element is related to the specific integer encoding, which we will elaborate more. With our encoding scheme, we only need to check a specific bit to determine whether Zw t > 0 is true. To satisfy all the security goals, we decide to use a GC protocol for this step that will be discussed in more detail. A pseudo-random number generator G is also used to protect the intermediate results.
As the last step Update does not involve crypto operations, we can skip its discussion. Algorithm 3 in Section A.2 summarizes the operations in this construction and Figure 3 depicts all the associated interactions between SP and CSP. We call this construction "HE+GC" and depending on the HE scheme used we may call it "Paillier+GC" or "RLWE+GC" for convenience. 
Technical Detail
In this section we discuss several key problems mentioned in the sketch of the construction above.
Choice of HE Schemes. We consider two choices of HE: Paillier [34] and RLWE [2] in our evaluations. Paillier has been the most popular AHE scheme during the past years. It uses 1024-bit keys to achieve around 80-bit security. Paillier scheme provides a large bit space allowing to preserve more precisions in floating-integer conversion, which might be critical for many scientific computing tasks. RLWE can do far more than just homomorphic addition -it was originally developed as a base component of fully homomorphic encryption scheme. We consider RLWE scheme for its faster computing time in large scales. Our evaluation shows that with message packing, all operations including encryption, decryption, addition and one-level multiplication are much faster than Paillier, although the ciphertext size might be larger than Paillier's. One note of caution is that RLWE's cost efficiency decreases for matrix-vector multiplication as the dimension of the training data increases due to high replication cost. Moreover, the current implementation of RLWE [20] restricts the number of plaintext bits that can be encrypted. We will analyze the cost growth for the two HE schemes as dependent on k and n, and also study the effect of bits selection on the quality of modeling result in experiments.
Integer Conversion. In practical scenarios, the users' data values are normally in floating-point representation. However, the HE schemes work on integers only. Thus, there are additional steps to convert the data to integers for encryption and then recover from the results the floating-point numbers with some precision loss. Since operations in our approach involve only additions and multiplication, we consider the following conversion for easier recovery. For a floating-point value x, x ∈ R, if we would like to preserve mdigit precision after the decimal point upon conversion and recovery, we have: v = ⌊10 m x⌋ mod q, where q is a large integer such that 10 m x ∈ (−q/2, q/2). Let the modulo operation map the values to [0, q), in such a way that the negative values are mapped to the upper range (q/2, q). It is easy to check that x is recoverable: if v > q/2, x ≈ (v − q)/10 m ; otherwise, x ≈ v/10 m . It is also easy to check that, if q is large enough to accommodate the multiplication and addition results without overflow, the modulo additions and multiplications preserve the signs and are thus recoverable. Another advantage of this encoding is the simplification of the evaluation of the RLC base classifiers, which turns out to be checking the sign of h t (x). Let b be the total number of bits to represent the values in [0, q). It trivial to learn that if the b-th bit of a value in the range [0, q) is 1, then the value is in the range (q/2, q), which is negative; otherwise the value is positive.
With this encoding, an n-bit plaintext space that allows one multiplication followed by α additions, as shown in our protocol, we get about (n − α)/2 bits to represent the original value. For easier processing, we normalize the original real values in the same dimension of training data before converting them to b bit integers.
Batched Data Submission with RLWE. When using RLWE message packing, we need to carefully design the data for submission. Considering each row or a record x i y i of the training data to be a vector of k dimensions, according to the message-packing method (Section 2), the matrix Z is actually encoded by columns for easier matrix-vector multiplication. Thus, the user will wait until h records are collected, where h is the number of slots that can be packed into one RLWE ciphertext. The h records are then encoded in k ciphertexts (columns) and submitted to SP. This method allows us to generate the most compact ciphertext for RLWE, minimizing the cost of communication. Note: For AHE encryption, users encrypt their submissions record-wise hence are free to either batch or stream them.
Secure Matrix-Vector Multiplication. The core operation in BaseApply in this construction is the homomorphic matrix-vector multiplication: E(Zw t ) = E(Z )w t . With an AHE encryption scheme and the plaintext operand w t , it is straightforward to apply homomorphic additions to get the result. When using RLWE, we can actually use its homomorphic multiplication directly upon SP's encryption of w t . Our experimental result shows that RLWE based matrix-vector multiplication is actually much faster than Paillier's for larger datasets within practical dimension limits.
Securely Checking Signs of E(u t ). The result of base classifier prediction, E(u t ) = E(Zw t ), needs to be checked to let CSP learn the correctness of prediction on each instance, so that the error rate, the model weight, and the sample weight update can be computed. With the described coding method, the sign checking u t,i < 0? is determined by a specific bit in the result. Note that letting CSP know u t directly may reveal too much information significantly weakening the security. To balance between security and efficiency, we decide to let CSP only learn the signs and nothing else is leaked, which is achieved with a noise addition procedure to hide the decrypted u t from CSP and a GC-based denoising and bit extraction procedure to let CSP learn the specific bit. We give the details of these procedures in the following.
To hide the plaintext u t from CSP, we use a noise addition method that can be easily implemented by SP on the encrypted vector with homomorphic addition: E(u t,0 ) = E(u t ) + E(λ t ), where λ t is a noise vector generated by the pseudo-random number generator P. Then, CSP can decrypt E(u t,0 ) to learn the noisy result. Let u t,1 = λ t held by SP. Now the problem is turned to using a GC to securely compute u t = u t,0 − u t,1 and return the specific bit of each element of u t . The circuit outputs msb(u t ) denoting the corresponding signs. Figure 4 shows the GC based denoising and bit extraction protocol. CSP's input to the circuit is the binary form of u ′ t elements whereas SP's inputs are the binary form of λ t elements. With associated oblivious transfer (OT) protocol and wire label transfers, the circuit can securely evaluate u ′ t − λ t and extract the most significant bit, msb(u t, j ), j = 1..n, of the result without leaking anything else. SP evaluates the circuits and returns the extracted encrypted bits (represented as output labels in GC) to CSP. CSP can then decrypt (re-map) the labels to generate the indicator vector I t .
Note that using the homomorphic property of RLWE, Lu et al. [29] show that it is possible to learn the result u t, j < 0? with a series of homomorphic operations. However, the algorithm is too expensive to be practical: a single comparison between two encrypted integers of 16-bits takes about a minute for SP to complete, 12 seconds for CSP to decrypt, and 80 KB communication [29] .
CONSTRUCTION WITH SecSh AND GC
Alternatively, we design our framework with a mixture of secret sharing and garbled circuit techniques. A somewhat similar approach was taken by [31] in constructing privacy-preserving gradient-descent based learning. It differs from the HE based construction in two aspects: 1) user data protection uses secret sharing, and 2) matrixvector multiplication happen over secret random splits of training data held by SP and CSP.
Instead of encryption, users randomly split their training data into two shares, one for SP and the other for CSP. The sum of shares recovers the original values. Any intermediate results that need protection are also in the form of random shares distributed between SP and CSP. As a result, multiplication of two values, say, a and b, each as random shares (e.g., SP holds a 0 and b 0 while CSP holds a 1 and b 1 , where a 0 + a 1 = a and b 0 + b 1 = b), needs the help of AHE encryption to compute each party's random share for ab. As for sign checking, we reuse the GC protocol designed earlier for the HE+GC construction.
Setup. Each user encodes her data Z with the same integer conversion mechanism described in the last section preserving a certain number of bit precision. Then, the user generates a random integer matrix with the same bit encoding scheme and a pseudo-random number generator G, denoted as Z 0 , derive Z 1 = Z − Z 0 , and securely distribute Z 0 to SP and Z 1 to CSP. SP generates the pool of p prospective weak classifier vectors w t . SP also generates a key pair for a chosen AHE scheme and shares the public key with CSP.
BaseApply. With SP holding Z 0 and w t , and CSP holding Z 1 , BaseApply will generate random shares of the result u t = Zw t = u t,0 − u t,1 : u t,0 and u t,1 held by SP and CSP, respectively. This is implemented with a special matrix-vector multiplication algorithm, which we will describe later.
ResultEval. With the random shares: u t,0 and u t,1 held by SP and CSP respectively, we can apply the same GC protocol presented in the last section for computing u = u t,0 − u t,1 and extracting the specific bits.
Algorithm 4 in Section A.2 outlines the construction and Figure  5 summarizes all the interactions between SP and CSP. We call this construction "SecSh + GC" henceforth. 
Technical Detail
The SecSh+GC construction shares many components with the HE+GC constructions, such as integer conversion and the GC protocol for sign checking. Here, we focus on the major difference -the protocol for computing matrix-vector multiplication with random shares.
Random-Share-Based Matrix-vector Multiplication. To initiate, SP and CSP respectively hold the two shares Z 0 and Z 1 of user data in plaintext, and SP also holds w t in plaintext. The goal is to 
derive random shares of Zw t and each party learns only one of the shares. SP computes the part Z 0 w t in plaintext by itself. The challenge is to collect the other part Z 1 w t without CSP knowing w t and no party knowing the complete result of Zw t . We use the following procedure to achieve this security goal. (1) SP encrypts w t with an AHE scheme and sends E(w t ) to CSP so that CSP can apply pseudohomomorphic multiplication to compute E(Z 1 w t ) = Z 1 E(w t ). (2) CSP generates a random vector λ t with the pseudo-random number generator G, encrypts it with the public key provided by SP, and apply homomorphic addition to get E(Z 1 w t + λ t ), which is sent back to SP. (3) SP decrypts it and sums up with the other part Z 0 w t to get Zw t + λ t . In the end, SP gets u t,0 = Zw t + λ t and CSP gets u t,1 = λ t , which is ready to use the GC protocol developed in Section 4.
COST ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the computation and communication complexity associated with both constructions. HE+GC Costs. For n records with k features, each user performs an one-time nk Paillier, or ⌈kn/h⌉ RLWE encryptions where h is the number of messages packed in one ciphertext, in forming encrypted matrix Z . The user's upload cost is exactly nk Paillier or ⌈kn/h⌉ RLWE ciphertexts. For evaluating p RLCs over encrypted training data Z n×k SP overtakes O(pnk) Paillier homomorphic multiplications and additions. If using RLWE, SP will need pk full replication operations and O(p ⌈n/h⌉k) homomorphic multiplications and additions to perform the matrix vector multiplication.
In passing the masked RLC evaluation results to CSP, SP takes p ⌈n/h⌉ RLWE or pn Paillier homomorphic additions while adding noise vector λ t to u t = Zw t . If RLWE is used, SP also needs to encrypt w t first to do the homomorphic additions, an additional cost of p(⌈n/h⌉ ⌈k/h⌉) encryptions. However, there is no need to encrypt the weight vectors if Paillier is used. After receiving the data, CSP conducts p ⌈n/h⌉ RLWE or pn Paillier decryptions.
The computational and communication costs on GC are all determined by the size of GC. For b-bit addition/subtraction, the size of GC is linear to b. Specifically, CSP will need O(pnb) symmetric encryptions to construct the GC and SP takes the same number of decryptions in evaluating the GC. In addition, GC of size O(pnb) should be transferred to SP.
SecSh+GC. This construction relieves the end users from any sort of cryptographic operations. Users' only cost is uploading Z 0 and Z 1 . In matrix-vector multiplication, SP takes pk encryptions in encrypting w t and passes the pk ciphertexts to CSP. CSP then takes pn encryptions to generate the noise vectors and conduct the homomorphic operations Z 1 w t + λ t , which include pnk homomorphic multiplications and additions in total. Finally, CSP sends back the pn ciphertexts and SP needs pn decryptions to get the random shares. As this protocol shares exactly the same GC component in HE+GC, we ignore the GC cost analysis.
In summary, we observe that HE+GC constructions demand no CSP storage and CSP only needs to conduct decryptions and GC constructions. In contrast, in SecSh+GC, the workload is almost equally distributed to SP and CSP. However, as user-generated data is not encrypted but split into random shares in SecSh+GC, users' costs and overall storage costs are much lower.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
According to the security model outlined in Section 3.2, we focus on the subcomponents of the protocols that involve both SP and CSP and implement a specific ideal function F . The security is proved by finding a simulator S of the adversary A in the ideal scenario such that the environment Z cannot distinguish the probabilistic outputs of Ideal and Real.
In the HE-GC construction, the major interaction happens in computing the indicator vector I t for an iteration t. The corresponding ideal function is defined as F (r S P,t , r CS P,t ) → I t , where r S P,t , r CS P,t are SP and CSP's inputs to the function respectively, and the function's output is the indicator vector I t . THEOREM 7.1. If the random number generator G is pseudorandom, and both the HE scheme and GC are CPA-secure, then the HE+GC construction of SecureBoost is secure in computing I t with an honest-but-curious adversary. Sketch Proof. In the real protocol, the environment machine Z can observe the inputs i S P,t = (E(Z ), w t , GC t , Label CS P,t ) and i CS P,t = (E(Zw t +λ t ), Label output,t , GC key ), and outputs: o S P,t = (λ t , Label output,t ) and o CS P,t = (GC t , I t ), where Label refers to the GC wire labels. By the security definition of HE, GC, and pseudorandomness, the variables except for the plaintext w t and I t cannot be distinguished from uniformly random values in polynomial time by the environment Z. Now, let us define an ideal world parallel to this real protocol. We design an ideal functionality F: with the inputs r S P,t = λ t and r CS P,t = E(Zw t + λ t ), it decrypts the inputs, removes the noise λ t , and computes the indicator vector I t . Assuming A compromises SP in the real world, we can think of a simulator S in the ideal world as follows. S generates a random vector λ t using G and computes E(Zw t + λ t ) which is sent to CSP. Again, if G is pseudo-random and HE is CPA-secure, it is impossible for Z to distinguish λ t and E(Zw t + λ t ) from uniformly random values in polynomial time. Therefore, Z cannot distinguish the outputs Ideal and Real computationally from what it has observed. For a compromised CSP, SP does the same operation, i.e. generate a random vector λ t using G and computes E(Zw t + λ t ), and the simulator for CSP simply forwards what it receives from SP to the ideal function. This proves that our protocol π UC-realizes the ideal functionality F (r S P,t , r CS P,t ) → I t .
Similarly, for the SecSh+GC construction, we have the following theorem. The proof can follow the same approach described in the above sketch proof. THEOREM 7.2. If the random number generator G is pseudorandom, both the AHE scheme and GC are CPA-secure, then the SecSH+GC construction is secure in computing I t with an honestbut-curious adversary.
Implication of the leakage function. We have shown that the learning protocol is UC-secure for CSP learning the indicator vector I t , which is also the leakage function only known by CSP. One may have the question: what exactly does this leakage function imply in terms of the leaked information? Recall that the indicator vector is defined as I t (h t (x i ) == y i ) for x i y i ∈ Z in each iteration. The elements of I t represent if the base RLC h t classifies the training instance x i correctly or incorrectly (1 and 0, respectively) . At the end of learning, each record x i gets p prediction results for p base classifiers h t , t = 1..p, respectively, which is denoted as c i = (c i,1 , . . . , c i,p ), c i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Let c i be the characterization vector for the record x i . Intuitively, two similar records (i.e., relatively small Euclidean distance) with the same label will get an identical characterization vector with high probability. Thus, once CSP observes two identical characterization vectors, CSP can infer that the corresponding records might be similar and their labels might be identical. This knowledge can be possibly utilized if CSP can somehow inject crafted records into the protocol and track the locations of the injected ones on the vectors I t . CSP can then approximately identify the records similar to the injected ones via their characterization vectors. However, the assumption of semi-honest and non-colluding SP and CSP in our framework excludes such an attack.
EXPERIMENTS
We design our experiment set on both real and synthetic datasets with three goals: (1) show random linear classifiers are effective weak classifiers for boosting; (2) evaluate associated computation, communication, and storage costs, and their distributions amongst the users, SP, and CSP for both the constructions; and (3) understand the trade-off between costs and model quality, including a comparison with another state-of-the-art privacy-preserving classification learning framework.
Implementation. We adopt the HELib library [20] for the RLWE encryption scheme, implement the Paillier cryptosystem [34] for the AHE encryption scheme, and use the ObliVM (oblivm.com) library for the garbled circuits. ObliVM has included the state-of-the-art GC optimization techniques such as HalfANDs, FreeXOR gates, and OTExtention. The core algorithms for data encoding, encryption, matrix-vector multiplications, and additive perturbation are implemented with C++ using GMP big integer library. Users' submissions are encoded with the 7-bit floating-integer conversion method (Section 4.1). We use the scikit-learn toolkit (scikit-learn.org) to evaluate the model quality for existing classifier learning methods selected for comparison purpose.
Parameter selection. We pick cryptographic parameters corresponding to 80-bit security. The RLWE parameters allow 32 bit message-space overall, 1 full vector replication, and at least 1 level of multiplication. The degree of the corresponding cyclotomic polynomial is set to ϕ(m) = 8, 190, which gives us h = 630 slots for message packing. The Paillier cryptosystem uses 1024 bits key-size to achieve approximately 80-bit security. Our GC-based sign checking protocol accommodates (2b + loд 2 (k))-bit inputs, where b is the bit-precision (i.e., b=7 in experiments) and k is the dimension of the training data.
Datasets. We test SecureBoost with both the synthetic and real datasets. Table 2 summarizes the dataset properties. Datasets are selected to cover a disparate range of dimensions and number of instances. All selected datasets contain only two classes to simplify the evaluations. The real datasets come from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [12] . The synthetic dataset is deliberately designed to generate non-linearly separable classes. It is used to conveniently explore and understand the behaviors of RLC-based boosting and the quality of non-linear classification modeling methods. Figure 6 shows a two-dimensional view of the synthetic dataset. Moreover, we use additional synthetic datasets (not listed in the table) of varying sizes to understand the effects of increasing dimensionality and number of records. 
Effectiveness of RLC Boosting
The performance of RLC-based boosting is investigated within two aspects: its convergence and the final accuracy. The speed of convergence is directly related to the overall cost of the SecureBoost protocols. We look at the number of base classifiers (τ ) needed to attain a certain level of accuracy. As a randomly generated RLC may fail (i.e., RLCs having ≈ 50% accuracy for the two-class datasets) and be discarded in some of the rounds, we also assess the actual number (p) of RLCs that are tried to generate the final model. All the accuracy results are for 10-fold cross-validation. The following results can be reproduced and verified with the scripts we have uploaded to https://sites.google.com/site/testsboost/. Figure 7 analyzes the convergence of RLC-based boosting. The left subfigure identifies for each dataset the number of iterations (or base classifiers) that lead to a stable model accuracy level. We observe that overall only about 200 base classifiers are sufficient for the considered datasets. The right subfigure compares boosting with different base classifiers: RLC, decision stumps (DS), and linear means classifiers (LMC) with one another when learning on the synthetic dataset. Clearly, DS has the advantage of converging faster The left subfigure in Figure 8 shows the final model quality produced by RLC boosting and the DS boosting (i.e., the default boosting method). We use 200 RLCs and varying number of DSs as shown in Table 2 as the base classifiers for the datasets. In every case, both methods generate models with almost identical accuracy. All of the above results suggest that RLC boosting is a robust boosting method to get high-quality classification models.
Encoding Bits. The number of bits for encoding affects the cost of GC-related components and the precision in floating-integer conversion, which in turn affects the final model quality. The right subfigure in Figure 8 shows the effect of preserved bits on model accuracy. It seems preserving 7 bits is sufficient to get optimal quality models. Table 3 reports the cost comparison of RLC and DS-based boosting just for the GC comparison portion of the protocol with the synthetic data encoded with 7 bits precision. The DS learning algorithm is based on Lindell et al. [28] . DS-based boosting incurs both computation and communication costs larger than that of the RLC-based by magnitudes. Note that we use 75 DS base classifiers to reach the optimal model quality as we mentioned. To be conservative, only 10 bins per feature is used in cost estimation for finding the optimal splits in learning decision stumps. 
Cost Distribution
We now inspect the associated costs for each involved party in the two constructions. We summarize the benchmark costs associated with the basic operations of the two encryption schemes in the Table 8 in Section A.1 based on 630 elements. Note that HELib uses a text format to store the ciphertext which we zip to minimize the costs. Since the sizes may vary slightly due to the text-based encoding, the RLWE costs are based on the average of 10 runs. It appears that RLWE's encryption and decryption costs are much lower than Paillier's, which helps lower CSP's computational costs in the RLWE-based construction. However, the RLWE's ciphertext is about 4 times of Paillier's, which results in higher communication costs. Optimizing RLWE's ciphertext encoding, e.g., using binary encoding, may help to some extent. Table 4 shows the parameter settings used for different datasets to achieve the desired model quality. τ is the number of base classifiers in the final boosting model. p represents the total number of RLCs that are tried in the modeling process, which determines the actual protocol costs. Overall, in about 1-2 tries on average, we can find a valid RLC (with accuracy > 50%). User's Costs. A user's costs depend on the size of training data, i.e. the number of training records, n, and the number of attributes, k, per record. The Paillier+GC construction requires each user to encrypt their submission element-wise in a streaming or a batched manner. The RLWE+GC construction requires each user to batch her submissions, encrypt them as a column-wise matrix E(Z ) and utilize message packing (see Section 2.3). For the SecSh+GC construction, users simply apply the one-time pad method to generate the masks and distribute the masked values to SP and the masks to CSP. Table 5 depicts the user's costs for encrypting and submitting one batch of records with the batch size h = 630. The HE+GC constructions are more expensive than SecSh+GC in all aspects, but still quite acceptable. The RLWE+GC construction costs more in ciphertext but less in computation than Paillier+GC.
SP and CSP cost distribution. As SP's and CSP's costs are highly inter-related in the SecureBoost constructions we discuss them together. First, we will analyze the non-GC components of the constructions -the shared GC component will be discussed later. Note: We use the Paillier cryptosystem in SecSh+GC as the required AHE scheme.
Since the costs are directly related to the size of training data, we try to understand the relationship using synthetic datasets of several sizes and dimensions. First, we fix the number of dimensions k = 20 and see how number of records n affects the costs. Figure  9 shows that both SP's and CSP's costs in RLWE+GC grow much slower than the other two's. CSP's growth rates are almost same for SecSh+GC and Paillier+GC, as they involve the same number of decryptions. Figure 10 depicts the effect of increasing the dimensions while fixing the number of records to n = 10, 000. We observe that RLWE+GC cost for SP grows much faster for the larger dimensions. This is due to the associated dimension-wise RLWE replication cost in the matrix-vector multiplication. On the other hand, CSP's cost when using RLWE+GC is much lower than with the other two constructions, as the RLWE decryptions are much cheaper than that of Paillier. Both SP and CSP's costs when using Paillier+GC and SecSh+GC stay almost flat as only n dominates the overall cost. Now we present the associated costs for the selected real and synthetic datasets listed in Table 2 . As all the constructions share the same GC component for sign checking, we list the costs associated only with the GC component in Table 7 . To recall, CSP constructs the GC while SP evaluates it and only the CSP can decode the signs returned by the GC. The number of AND gates represents the size of GC. The computational and communication costs include the total of SP's and CSP's. GC's associated costs are linear to n and the number of bits b.
Finally, Table 6 sums up the costs for all the components. For the smaller datasets, the RLWE+GC construction does not show much advantage over the other two. For datasets with the larger number of records such as the synthetic dataset, both SP and CSP take less Figure 11 portray these patterns more clearly.
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Comparing with Other Methods
In this section, we compare SecureBoost with two recently developed privacy-preserving classification modeling methods and analyze the unique advantages of SecureBoost. A recent study [31] shows that privacy-preserving logistic regression and neural network (NN) protocols [22] can be implemented based on secret sharing [9] . Both protocols use the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) method to learn the classifying models. To evaluate the model quality, we follow the parameter settings used by Mohassel et. al [31] during training. Specifically, a two-hidden-layer neural network is constructed with the first layer for the input features, the second and third layer with five nodes each, and a single output node for the two-class problem. We tried different sizes of inner hidden layers and found this setting is the minimum size to satisfactorily handle the non-linearly separable synthetic data in our training data set. SGD is conducted with a mini-batch size of 128 records for training the neural network, but with the entire dataset for logistic regression. Both algorithms run enough iterations until convergence. Figure 12 shows that all the three methods (SecureBoost, SecureML Logistic Regression, and SecureML Neural Network) perform similarly except for the non-linearly separable synthetic data, for which logistic regression underperforms quite significantly. It is well-known that logistic regression cannot handle non-linearly separable data [22] , while the other two can certainly do. This result can also be reproduced and verified with the scripts we have uploaded to https://sites.google.com/site/testsboost/.
Next, we look into the costs of learning on the synthetic dataset. Although logistic regression was not on par with the other two algorithms, we also include it in this comparison. Figure 13 shows that all the SecureBoost constructions are much more efficient than the neural network protocol. It turns out the neural network takes 160 iterations to converge while logistic needs only 10 iterations and stuck on the non-optimal result. 
RELATED WORK
Theoretically, FHE allows any function to be evaluated on encrypted data by one party, an ideal setting for learning models from sensitive user-generated data. However, the current implementation is still too expensive to apply on complex functions. ML Confidential [19] shows that simple linear models, such as linear means classifier and Fisher's discriminant analysis, can be learned by a semi-honest SP from FHE-encrypted data with acceptable costs. However, these simple models are unable to handle non-linearly separable datasets. Moreover, the learning algorithms require the labels of training data to be revealed to SP. Lu et al. [29] show that PCA and linear regression can also be implemented on FHE encrypted data with reasonable costs for a limited number of iterations in the algorithms. The operation of comparison is also very expensive to implement for FHE encrypted data [18, 29] , which hinders the FHE's application in more complex algorithms.
The performance of GC has been greatly improved during the recent years due to new optimization techniques such as Free XOR gates [25] , Half AND gates [40] , and OTExtensions [1] . As it translates every operation to bit-based gates and each bit is associated with a few encryptions, decryptions, and truth-table passing, the overall cost is still high. Nikolaenko et al. [32, 33] use FastGC [23] and AHE to implement matrix factorization and linear ridge regression solutions. As GCs are heavily used in the core operations, these protocols suffered from unbearable communication costs between CSP and SP resulting from the GC based. In our designs, we carefully craft the primitive operations to minimize the performance impact of the GC-related operations.
Secret sharing has been considered as another general approach to achieving secure multi-party computation. Demmler et al. [9] have shown that basic matrix operations can be implemented on random shares held by different parties. SecureML [31] utilized these operations and GC to implement the gradient-descent learning method with a two-server model. As we have shown in our evaluation, the two-server model almost equally distributes the workload to each server, not ideal for the SP-CSP setting. Classifiers like neural networks can be implemented with the gradient descent method to achieve satisfactory performance on non-linearly separable datasets, but the costs appear much higher than our boosting methods.
Perturbation is also used to protect the privacy of user-generated data. Locally differential privacy [10] is developed for users submitting their perturbed private data to a service provider, without being identified or distinguished from other users -a different approach to preserve users' privacy. Shokri et al. [36] also study privacypreserving deep learning that assumes each party (e.g., a user in our setting) shares partial gradient updates that are protected with differential privacy. These studies differ from our approach in a few aspects. First, perturbation involves a fundamental trade-off between data quality and privacy protection, while ours does not. Second, it assumes SP will not actively trace the source of submission, or users use some trusted anonymizer to hide the source of submission.
Recent studies on model-based attacks show that adversaries may explore exposed predictive models to breach user data privacy. Fredrikson et al. [13, 14] try to estimate a protected sensitive input based on the model output by reversing the learned models such as linear regression. Shokri et al. [37] try to infer if a record was part of the training dataset based on the exposed model. The success of these attacks depends on the adversary's unrestrained access to the models. Thus, a reasonable approach is to prevent curious parties seeing the entire model in the secure learning procedure and freely applying the learned models later. Our approach achieves this goal by SP learning the base models and CSP learning the weights of base models, separately. This split model parameter learning can be possibly achieved by some existing learning approaches [31] , but difficult by others [33] .
CONCLUSION
User-generated data have great values for service providers(SP) to build powerful prediction models. However, the privacy issues have raised great concerns recently. We develop the SecureBoost protocol for SP to learn high-quality boosted classification models from encrypted or randomly partitioned users' data. The key idea is to use random linear classifiers as the base classifiers to simplify the protocol design. Two constructions: HE+GC and SecSh+GC have been developed, using a novel combination of homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits, and randomized secret sharing to protect privacy and achieve efficiency. We formally analyze the security of protocol and show that the constructions satisfy the universally composable security for multiparty computation. Finally, our experimental evaluation examines the intrinsic relationships among primitive selection, cost distribution, and model quality. Our results show that the SecureBoost approach is very practical in learning high-quality classification models.
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